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Abstract 
In the main, writing about care seems to contrast the ethics of justice with the ethics 
of care. Whilst the former deploys objectivity, the latter holds that individuals are 
connected. Problematically, contemporary primary education seemingly holds a-
personal, justice conceptions as its basis and rationale. In turn, primary education, in 
parts, adopts justice orientations for the way in which it organises and controls. This 
paper sets out to identify the way in which care can be conceived of as an alternative 
to justice-based conceptions of morality, and hence its applicability to the 
educational sphere. It takes, as its starting point the contribution made by Carol 
Gilligan, and examines her work for the ways in which it counters justice mechanisms 
through its celebration of a different voice. However, a warning is sounded: the 
neoliberal line holds court in the drive to design education; to simply cite care as the 
foil to this is problematic. For in so doing lies the danger that care is simply ignored 
due to the paternalistic hold justice conceptions have. To this end I propose that care 
be seen as a partner for justice and neoliberalism and not a mere alternative.  
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Why do some areas of the text appear in bold?  I suspect this relates to changes that 
have been made and now confirmed as accepted?  Please confirm and make the 
typeface consistent throughout.    I have done this  W it was a hangover from when I 
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resubmitted with changes.
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Introduction 
Throughout the literature it is ĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐĂƌĞ ?ŝƐĂĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?ƐtŝůŬŝŶƐŽŶ
ŶŽƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ‘ ?ŝƐŶŽĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨĐĂƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĚĞĨŝŶĞƐǁŚǇƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽ
ŐŝǀĞĐĂƌĞ ?ŽƌǁŚĂƚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂŶĚĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ‘ĐĂƌŝŶŐ ? ?
(1995: 212). Theories seem to describe a continuum of human experience that 
stretches between, on the one hand, caring as the provision of warmth and feeling, 
and, on the other, caring as a technical endeavour. 
 
Usually foregrounded in the literature, however, is the broadly conceived of contrast 
between the so-called ethics of care and the so-called ethics of justice (Tong, 1998). 
/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƌŽů'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐIn a Different Voice (1982) writers 
have spent time debating the relative merits of care versus justice, virtues versus 
principles. These debates have given rise to a rich seam of discussion. In particular, 
ƚŚĞǇŽĨƚĞŶĐĞŶƚƌĞŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŵĂůĞ ?Žƌ ‘ŵĂƐĐƵůŝŶĞ ?ǀŝĞǁƐĞƐƉŽƵƐŝŶŐ
justice and principle as the defining features of ethical action, and those of a 
 ‘ĨĞŵĂůĞ ? ? ‘ĨĞŵŝŶŝŶĞ ?Žƌ ‘ĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚ ?ŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞǀŝƌƚƵĞĂŶĚ ?ŽƌĐĂƌĞĂƐƚŚĞŝƌ
defining feature. Although this debate has often polarised thinking and has, more 
recently, come in for much criticism, it is fair to say that the bi-polar orientation is 
one that requires consideration in any work that seriously wishes to discuss care and 
its relationship to educational practice. For it is not only in the realm of professional 
practice such as education or social work that this debate has raged; those 
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŵĞĚŝĐŝŶĞ ?ǁŚŽ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚŽĨƚĞŶĞƋƵĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ĐĂƌĞ ?ŝŶŽŶĞĨŽƌŵ
or another seem to take their stance from more objective, positivist perspectives, 
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have also been subject to calls for their work to be construed via such oppositional 
thinking. 
 
It is important, then, that this contrast is illuminated, not because it can provide 
definitive answers but rather due to the opportunities such debate offers for 
subsequent analysis of education policy. Accordingly, this paper is organised into 
four parts. In the first I offer neoliberalism as one of the defining features for current 
educational policy and the ways in which this orients the work of primary schools. 
Here I note the ways in which neoliberal constructs have adopted a justice-based 
approach in determining the ways and means by which education might be more 
 ‘ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ/ŶŽƚĞŚŽǁƚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇŶŽǁ
point education towards distant, a-personal approaches. 
 
I contrast this, in the second section, with a discussion about the ways in which care 
ethics have been offered as an alternative to the justice orientation. Here I give 
consideration to the traditional role care has in primary education; the way in which 
primary education and care are intertwined is examined. In support I outline the 
work of Carol Gilligan and her conceptions of justice and care. In the third section I 
ŽƵƚůŝŶĞ'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚĐĂƌĞĂŶĚũƵƐƚŝĐĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞǀŝĞǁĞĚŵĞƌĞůǇĂƐ
opposites but rather as complementary; to examine care without justice, or justice 
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĐĂƌĞŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?/ŶƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ/ŶŽƚĞŚŽǁƵƐĞĨƵů'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐŝŶ
assisting educationalists to restructure their thinking about the role for justice-based 
orientations and care-based inclinations. I use her work to illuminate an approach 
that sees care, not in opposition to justice, but rather as a partner to its cold, rational 
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orientation. This section shows how it is possible to conceive of justice in terms of 
care and how the two might operate together to effect a better position for 
education. 
 
Justice and primary schooling 
A common theme in the literature is the way in which primary education has come 
to be centred on a view of education that is synonymous with legitimising rights and 
obligĂƚŝŽŶƐ PƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƉĂƌĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƉƵƉŝůƐƚŽĂ ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ
on teachers to provide this. Success is thus determined through quantitative 
attainment published in international league tables such as those produced by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). What is in place 
is a means of control that requires schools to demonstrate quantitative uplift 
through measures designed to reify pupil progress. For some this is a performativity 
discourse (Ball, 2003) replete with messages about what is to be valued and judged. 
In turn these form the cornerstone of political and media pronouncements about the 
state of primary education, and leave the profession open to accusation, allegation, 
plaudit and control which, variously, condemn or celebrate. This position stems from 
political moves which seek to use education as an electoral lever; that is to say, 
politics now positions education as an important mechanism by which to gain 
electoral advantage. Politicians speak, variously, of the need for education to raise 
standards, attend to under-performance and equip the future workforce (Forrester, 
2005). 
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Education is, then, a political endeavour in that it requires us to think about the ways 
in which it is structured, monitored and controlled. In this regard, it is clear that the 
neoliberal agenda, which has been in the ascendency for at least the last thirty years, 
has been one of the main drivers of social and public policy. Indeed, Giroux (2002: 
425) maintains that neoliberĂůŝƐŵŝƐ ‘ ?ƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵŽĨ
ŽƵƌƚŝŵĞ ? ?,ĞƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ ‘ ?ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂŶĚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞďǇĂƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞŚĂŶĚĨƵůŽĨ
private interests are permitted to control as much as possible of social life in order to 
maximise their personal profŝƚ ? ? In this discourse the market is presented as 
common-sense; individual property rights and the rule of law are favoured (Harvey, 
2005) and individual responsibility is called for through the auspices of accountability 
via the measures of audit and inspection. Harvey (2005: 5) also notes that in 
choosing individual freedom as its basis, neoliberalism supports the very fabric of 
civilisation as we know it. 
 
The founding figures of neoliberal thought took political ideals of human 
dignity and individual frĞĞĚŽŵĂƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ?ĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůǀĂůƵĞƐŽĨ
ĐŝǀŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ŶƐŽĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĞǇĐŚŽƐĞǁŝƐĞůǇ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞŝŶĚĞĞĚĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐ
and seductive ideals. These values, they held, were threatened not only by 
fascism, dictatorships, and communism, but by all forms of state intervention 
that substituted collective judgements for those of individuals free to choose. 
 
Accordingly, success and failure are, respectively, interpreted in terms of 
entrepreneurial virtues or personal failings rather than through any reason of the 
system (Harvey, 2005); well-being is seen as an individual issue and, accordingly, the 
individual is required to think only of himself. Neoliberalism locates the person as a 
rational decision-maker and ignores the interdependent nature of human existence, 
preferring instead to extol the virtues of economic individualism. It promotes life as a 
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 ‘ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ ?ƚŚĞƐĞůĨŝƐƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
(Pick and Taylor, 2009: 78). Social visions are dismissed as hopelessly out of date and 
the entrepreneurial self becomes ascendant (Giroux, 2002). 
 
The rise of Neo-Liberalism as one of the defining features for the operationalisation 
and the conceptualisation of education in turn identifies certain features for 
consideration. Its agenda of quantitative judgement marks out educational success 
in terms of simplistic measures not entirely related to dealing with the issues which 
cause educational underachievement. In this way aspects such as social class or 
disadvantage are elided, to ďĞƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚďǇŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇĂŶĚ
effectiveness. The mechanisms by which education is judged are specific to the 
classroom and any relationship to wider social and political forces is usually 
underplayed. Indeed, at the classroom level, the rise of efficiency-measures and 
pedagogic modes designed to elevate standards and concomitant teaching-learning 
relationships centre on definitions for education conspicuous in their drive to give 
ƉƵƉŝůƐ ‘ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚĞƐĞƌǀĞ ? ?/ŶĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂƐŝŶŽƚher areas of social policy, such 
matters have an international flavour. For example, economic imperatives for 
education have been seen as far afield as Australia (Shacklock, 1998). In Britain, 
ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞĨŽƌŵĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?WƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĂǀŝd Cameron said 
 
These radical proposals will give teachers both the freedom and the authority 
in the classroom that's needed if we are to realise our ambition to drive up 
standards, improve discipline and behaviour and deliver the world class 
education that our children deserve. (Department for Education (DfE), 2010, 
emphasis added) 
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ƚƚŚĞŝƌŚĞĂƌƚƐƵĐŚŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞ ‘ŽƵŐŚƚŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐ
whereby children are defined by their individual rights to a quality education. In 
essence what are described are versions of justice bound up with notions of 
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. This preoccupation with rigour and 
standards leans towards a sense of individual rights: educational policy becomes 
concerned with the intentionality and correctness of the learning and achievement 
endeavour. Now this is not to say that increasing attainment is wrong or that a 
commitment to justice is misplaced; for as Baier (1995: 47) notes, justice is an 
essential part of social flourishing: 
 
Let me say quite clearly at this early point that there is little disagreement 
that justice is a social value of very great importance, and injustice an evil. 
Nor would those who have worked on theories of justice want to deny that 
other things matter besides justice. 
 
However, this position signals that as ethical activities, justice-based conceptions 
hold sway in political thinking and educational policy. Indeed, what has characterised 
much of the writing in the field of professional, ethical decision-making are 
constructs based, more or less firmly, on a desire for universality or utility. In 
particular, such debates have been characterised by the view that ethical decisions 
ĂƌĞŵĂĚĞďǇŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?dŚŝƐƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŚĞ ?
ĨƌŽŵ ‘ŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ? ?ƚŚĞŵĂůĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƵƐĞĚƚŽĚĞŶŽƚĞƚŚĞ
ŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞǀŝĞǁ ?ŝƐƉƵƌƐƵĂŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌ ‘ŵĂŶ ?ƚŽ
occupy a world whose ontology is conceived and populated by selves in-opposition-
to others (TŽŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ,ĞůĚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ŶŽƚĞƐ ? ‘'ĞŶĞƌĂůŝǌŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
 “ƉƵďůŝĐ ?ĚŽŵĂŝŶŽĨůĂǁĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐƚŽƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞŽĨŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ
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ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇŽĨƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĞƚŚŝĐƐŝŶƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƌŶĞƌĂ ? ?tŚĂƚŝƐƐŽƵŐŚƚŝƐƚŚĞĚĞŶŝĂůŽĨ
 ‘ ?ŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ relations, focussing instead on relations and actions in 
ĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝǌĂďůĞŵĂǆŝŵƐ ? ? ?<ŽĞŚŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ?  dŚŝƐƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƚǇŝƐ
exercised through visions for education that transcend the local. The specificity of 
the micro is elided, replaced instead with views for education which celebrate 
success as measured against corporate standards. Pupils are judged against a raft of 
central targets. Such a focus on the universal seeks to separate subjectivity and 
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝŶŝƚƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂ “ǀŝĞǁĨƌŽŵŶŽǁŚĞƌĞ ? ?ĂƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů
epistemology to whose objectivity we might defer. In turn, the employment of 
Western, scientific reasoning to argue for quasi-mathematical maxims for action not 
only implies moral status but also the maturity of a position; the use of universal 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐĨŽƌŵƐĂŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂ ‘ŐŽĚ ?ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƚƌƵŵƉƐŽƚŚĞƌ ?
ůŽĐĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?^ƵĐŚŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝƌŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŵĂƚƵƌŝƚǇ ?ĞŶĂďůĞŽƚŚĞƌ
ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƚŽďĞĐĂƐƚĂƐ ‘ŝŵŵĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞďǇŝŐŶŽƌĂďle. Notably, 
this permits a lack of consultation; as the desire is to state, defend and apply 
universal principles, the purview of the particular and situated can be dismissed as 
irrational and therefore amoral. 
 
The neoliberal discourse, then, presents as rational the individual with attendant 
rights to an education which contribute to marking out the pupil as economically 
viable. It is a distant position, one borne not of relationships but of audit; the 
defining feature speaks of cost not worth. Indeed, whilst presenting the political 
rationale for changes to educational policy, politicians and policy makers will often 
ŽƵƚůŝŶĞƚŚĞŝƌĐĂƐĞŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚŽƌŵĂŬŝŶŐ ‘ŽƵƌ ?ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ
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system the best in the world. Presented as a series of arguments about entitlement, 
such messages play to a sense of rational decision-making; a sense that it is beyond 
question that such aims are laudable and worthwhile. But what is of note are the 
ways in which the mechanisms for the achievement of such aims are oft presented 
as the operationalisation of justice: justice for pupils, justice for parents. Such justice, 
the population is told, is future oriented: ensuring that the adults of tomorrow can 
play their economic part in society. In stripping away the informal and imposing a 
view of education replete with connotations of justice and duty, current educational 
policy has as its modus operandi a set of criteria against which the progress of all can 
be judged. Indeed, individuals are accounted for in terms of league tables and the 
like, not for the implicit worth they have as human beings. Now, this is not to deny 
that success at school is important, but rather it signals that the underpinning 
reasons for striving for success are personal to the individual and judged in terms of 
the quantitative uplift educational success can lead to and subsequent monetary 
offerings in the form of wages and position in society: economic imperatives hold 
sway. 
 
This requires consideration though. For in the drive to align education with 
economics and thus bring opportunity to individuals, if not now, then in the future, 
education is positioned as requiring of a mode of operation that assuages issues of 
individual right. The good that is to be gleaned is the good that comes from 
contributing as homo-economicus. Gaze is thus cast over the ways in which an 
understanding of education can be better aligned with the economic, social and 
political ideal of neoliberalism. What neoliberalism holds up is a proclivity for seeing 
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education in terms of rationality and reason. Importantly here, Osgood (2006: 8) 
notes that '...neoliberal discourse places an emphasis upon being rational above an 
ethic of care.' 
 
From justice ethics to care ethics in primary education 
It is, then, fair to note that primary education has become highly politicised. Indeed, 
although primary education can be said to have a rationale of its own, a position 
which stems from a view that the primary child has a unique perspective on the 
world, this has come in for challenge in the current economic, cultural and political 
climate. For within the primary school rationale is the acknowledgement that care 
should form part of the primary education staple; a position endorsed by the likes of 
Nias (1989). Although curricular and assessment changes may have sharpened the 
focus on progress and attainment, an ethic of care is still prevalent (Webb and 
Vulliamy, 2001). This orientation is worldwide; indeed, citing the work of Nias, 
^ŚĂĐŬůŽĐŬ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ǁƌŝƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨĞĞů ?ŽĨƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ PƚŚĞ ‘ĐĂƌŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ?,ŝƐ
ǁŽƌŬ ?ŝŶĂŶƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶƐĐŚŽŽů ?ƐŝŐŶƉŽƐƚƐƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚŽƌǇůŝŶĞŽĨĐĂƌĞ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇĨŽƵŶĚ
in teacher statements about professionalism; the way in which teachers defined 
themselves was in terms of care. Working in the UK, Cortazzi (1991) also found that 
ƚĞĂĐŚĞƌƐ ?ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚĞĂĐŚĞƌƐ ‘ĐĂƌĞ ? ?/ŶƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚĞƌŵƐ ?ĂŵƉďĞůů
and Neill (1994) note that it is social factors which orient teachers towards an ethic 
of care. Caution should be taken here though: Ashley and Lee (2003) talk of the 
ĚŝƐƚĂŶƚ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨ ‘ĐĂƌĞĂďŽƵƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ?ĐůĂƐƐƌŽŽŵůĞǀĞů ‘ĐĂƌĞ
ĨŽƌ ? ?dŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǇĐŽŶƚĞŶĚ ?ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐŚŝŐŚĞƌƐƚĂƚƵƐĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƚ
fits with attendant modes for the operationalisation of schools. In a sense what they 
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note are the ways in which aspects of educational policy position education, in some 
respects, towards the ideals of the managerial state. As Osgood (2006: 10) states, 
often an ethic of care and emotional labour, even though cornerstones to 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ?ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ? ‘ ?ĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĚĞŶŝŐƌĂƚĞĚ
in hegemonic professionalism discourses.' 
 
Additionally, work in moral and political philosophy has challenged the focus on the 
autonomous, abstract, rationĂůĂŐĞŶƚĂŶĚŽŶ ‘ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ĂƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?
tƌŝƚŝŶŐŝŶƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘KǆĨŽƌĚ ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚŝƚƐĞǆĂůƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ǁŝůů ?
power and judgement for thĞƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ƌŝƐDƵƌĚŽĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞĚ
for a moral philosophy whicŚ ‘ ?ŚĞůƉƐƵƐůĞĂƌŶŚŽǁƚŽĨŽĐƵƐŽƵƌĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ
ǁŚŽŵǁĞĐĂŶƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĂƐ ‘ƌĞĂů ? ? ? ?ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?^ƚĂƌƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞ
that individuals are naturally attached, Murdoch argued 
 
 ?ŝƚŝƐƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ƉƵƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚhose attachments 
ǁŚŝĐŚŵƵƐƚďĞƚŚĞƚĂƐŬŽĨŵŽƌĂůƐ ?DŽƌĂůŝƚǇŝƐŶŽƚũƵƐƚĂďŽƵƚĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚĐĂŶ
be about learning how to wait, be patient, trust, and listen. (Robinson, 1999: 
17) 
 
It is attention to individuals: the lives we lead and the loving relations we make 
asserted Murdoch, which constitutes morality. Morality is not an act of will, but the 
practice of attention tied to love (Murdoch, 1970: 28). In essence, Murdoch 
advocated replacing justice with the care perspective (Hekman, 1993: 156). 
 
It is clear, though, that care is attuned not only to the nurturing role: it presents a 
discourse which offers a lens through which to examine. It offers a means whereby 
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professionals can construct an identity for themselves and a label for their work. For 
care is an important aspect of male and female teachers; it is part of the 
 ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŶƵƌƚƵƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?^ŵĞĚůĞǇĂŶĚWĞƉƉĞƌĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
/ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁŝƚŚĂŶ ‘ĞƚŚŝĐƐŽĨĐĂƌĞ ?ŚĂƐŝƚƐŽƌŝŐŝŶƐŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨŵŽƌĂů
and social psychologists such as Nancy Chodorow (cf. 1978) and Carol Gilligan (cf. 
1982) as well as philosophers such as Nel Noddings (cf. 1984) and Sarah Ruddick (cf. 
1989). In this vein, whilst the well-known and oft cited work of Jean Piaget (cf. 1997) 
and Lawrence Kohlberg (cf. 1958) provide the cornerstone of much thinking in the 
realm of moral developmental theory, many feminist psychologists have critically 
examined the psychology of moral agency. Of these, perhaps the most influential has 
been Carol Gilligan (1982) whose work was a response to the neo-Piagetian, 
deontological reasoning approach advocated by Kohlberg (1958). 
 
Clarity is needed here though. Whilst care is something promoted by traditional 
primary education discourse, this is not necessarily the same thing as that promoted 
by moral philosophers or psychologists alike. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
latter are concerned with the development of moral reasoning alone and thus are 
less interested in the ways in which primary education is organised and run. In this 
regard, care is less an educational issue than a psychological one. What is relevant, 
however, is the way in which care, as a matter of interpersonal relationships, aligns 
itself with the matter of education. The positions adopted by the psychology of 
morality within a care framework thus offer starting points for educational 
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deliberation. They hold up for scrutiny something which should be at the heart of 
education: the relational.  
 
Similarly, philosophical discussions should not be confused with psychological ones. 
What follows may well discuss the two, but it is not enough to simply position them 
as synonymous. This said it is clear that philosophical writings have developed out of 
psychological positions; and vice versa. I am not seeking to elide the differences 
between the two; rather I wish to demonstrate the development in care-based 
thinking; to do this requires consideration of both psychological and philosophical 
deliberation and theory. Such theory has been used to elucidate a position for 
educational care and to ignore this is unwise. However, there is a need to remember 
that such writings whilst influential are not necessarily synonymous. 
 
What is clear from these two positions, though, is the place and form for care. As 
Held writes 
 
Rather than assuming, as do the dominant moral theories, that moral 
relations are to be seen to be entered into voluntarily by free and equal 
individuals, the ethics of care is developed for the realities, as well, of 
unequal power and unchosen relations.' (2004: 143) 
 
The psychological turn 
Until Gilligan, moral development theory was heavily attuned to the ideas of 
Kohlberg (1984), who, in turn, was heavily influenced by the neo-Kantian 
philosopher John Rawls (1971). Rawls philosophical views on moral development 
proposed a three stage model: morality of authority; of association; and of 
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principles. The initial, temporary morality of authority is based on love and gives 
ǁĂǇ ?ĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇ ?ƚŽƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐǁŚĞƌĞĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ ‘ĨŝƌƐƚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?ƚĂŬĞƚŚĞ
place oĨ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ?ZĂǁůƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?^ƉĞĂŬŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĂĚ ĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ?
<ŽŚůďĞƌŐ ?ƐƚŚƌĞĞ-level, six-stage psychological theory of moral development echoes 
this: the initial pre-conventional gives way to the conventional which in turn gives 
way to the post-conventional. For Kohlberg, the stages are scientific and empirical. 
Kohlberg also maintained that the stages are culturally and individually evolutionary; 
thus, pre-linguistic cultures do not attain the post-conventional stage, but within 
particular cultures, development to higher stages happens as individuals mature. 
Finally, Kohlberg made the point that the presence of thinking at a higher stage does 
not make that thinking more moral, rather, he implied, such thinking is more 
adequate for solving moral problems. 
 
'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĐůĞĂƌůǇŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚďŽƚŚĐĂƌĞĂŶĚũƵƐƚŝĐĞ
frameworks as mechanisms employed to discuss moral dilemmas by both genders. It 
was her contention that subjects are constituted through discursive formation and 
that moral voices stem from this (Hekman, 1993). Theoretically her work was not 
entirely new; it echoed the philosophical ideas and principles of Iris Murdoch. 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚDƵƌĚŽĐŚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝƐǀĞƌǇƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽ'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐƚŚĞƚǁŽƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĚŝĨĨĞƌ
both in terms of discipline and in that Gilligan argues for a non-hierarchical dualism 
of justice and care. As a seminal influence, Gilligan proposed that the different voices 
evidenced in her empirical work described gender-different ways of speaking about 
moral dilemmas. Using the analogy that how perceptual patterns are viewed often 
ƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽƉƌŝŽƌĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚǁĂǇƐŽĨƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?'ŝůůŝŐĂŶŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ
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people are aware of both perspectives, they tend to adopt one or the other in 
defining and reƐŽůǀŝŶŐŵŽƌĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ?'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? ? ?^ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ
moral issues require decisions to be made, it is often the case that a particular 
perspective may well become adopted for the clarity it offers. However, such clarity 
can also preclude the use of alternative positions, especially when the one favoured 
ďůĞŶĚƐǁŝƚŚũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚƵƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ ‘ďĞƚƚĞƌ ?ǁĂǇŽĨ
ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŵŽƌĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?/ŶĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ?ŚĞƌĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇŝƐĂ ‘ĨŽĐƵƐ
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ? ?,ĞŬman, 1993: 145). 
 
What Gilligan noted, was a psychological predilection by respondents to continue to 
present reasons based on either one of justice or care when pressed for alternatives 
or clarification, and that such predilections were gender oriented: females were 
more likely to use the care-as-moral perspective. Indeed, in support Johnston (1988) 
found that even though by the age of eleven, children are able to shift between the 
two perspectives, there is still a marked gender preference in their articulated moral 
problem-solving methods. This, Gilligan argues, is part of the reason for the 
preponderance of justice-based ethical decision-making, broadly adopted 
throughout contemporary moral philosophy. 
 
/ŶƉŽŝŶƚ ?'ŝůůŝŐĂŶŽĨĨĞƌƐƚŚĞ ‘ĐĂƌĞƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂƐ ĂĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ‘ǀŝƐŝŽŶŽƌĨƌĂŵĞ ?
by which moral development might be considered. Based on observations of the 
moral judgements employed by college students and pregnant women considering 
abortion, Gilligan posited that women, especially when speaking about their own 
experiences of moral conflict and choice, spoke in ways inconsistent with the 
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assumptions that, at the time, shaped thinking about the development of moral 
reasoning and choice-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ?&Žƌ'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?<ŽŚůďĞƌŐ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐĂƌĞƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?
Whereas Kohlbergian theory posits that the ways women described their ethical 
decision-making was less mature by virtue of their representation lower down a six-
stage, three-level progression of moral thinking, Gilligan maintained that this view 
was a result of problems in the original representation rather than inherent 
ǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĨĞŵĂůĞƐ ?dŚĂƚ<ŽŚůďĞƌŐ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ
originates in the traditional paradigm of western scientific enquiry is of relevance to 
'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐƌĞĨƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ P<ŽŚůďĞƌŐ ?ƐŚe argued, started his work on the basis that what 
constitutes morality had already been defined, and then proceeded to gather 
evidence to support his ideas and claims. Essentially, Gilligan claimed that Kohlberg 
 ‘ǀŝĞǁĞĚ ?ŚŝƐĚĂƚĂĨƌŽŵĂƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƚŝĐƐƚĂŶĚƉoint that was always going to locate 
thinking and problem-solving that did not fit with neo-Kantian ideals as of lesser 
stature. Indeed, Gilligan desired to rescue the particularistic and personal from the 
assertion that they are amoral, and reconfigure them as a legitimate, moral realm, 
equal to the abstract, formalistic sphere of justice and rights (Hekman, 1993: 523). In 
so doing, she needed to question the assumptions inherent within the Kohlbergian 
tradition. 
 
'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŐĂŝŶĞĚƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶĐĞ ?ŶŽƚŽŶůy for its challenge to the then dominant, 
Kohlbergian moral development position, but also for the questions it asked 
concerning the universal philosophies of the time. For, as Hekman (1995) noted, 
taking care, relationship and connection as integral to human life and flourishing 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƐƚŽƌŝĞƐƚŽďĞĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚĂƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵ ?ďƵƚĞƋƵĂůƚŽŵŽƌĂůŝĚĞĂƐ
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based on abstract principles. Further, in her critique of Piaget whose work also 
heavily influenced Kohlberg, Gilligan posited that the differences exhibited by girls 
when talking about the logic of rules and games highlighted, not deficiencies in 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽƌƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨŝĚĞĂƐŽĨũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌŐŝƌůƐ ?ƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
logic of rules and games. As Kohlberg equated moral development with the 
development of justice reasoning and conducted his research, initially, on an all-male 
sample he therefore did not encounter such gendered issues. Even though Kohlberg 
ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇƌĞǀŝƐĞĚŚŝƐƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞŚŝƐƚŚĞŽƌǇĂƐĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨ “ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ
reasoninŐ ? ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚƵƐĞŽĨŚŝƐŝĚĞĂƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŝƐŚŝƐ
ďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĐĂƌĞƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŽƌĂůƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? 
 
To sum, Spader (2002) notes four ways in which Gilligan challenged traditional 
ethical theory: by virtue of the fact that until her work research subjects had been 
mostly male; that the theories proposed are predominantly the preserve and 
product of males; that the descriptors used are often linear and reductionist; and, 
that justice is the major theme. 
 
The dualism of justice and care 
What is clear is that Gilligan posits that whilst the expression of a moral standpoint is 
ĂŵŽƌĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?ĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞconstrued as, at times, in 
conflict with the stated problem-solving preference. Hence, to take expressed 
positions as indicative of moral development is an obfuscation; that expressed is not, 
necessarily indicative of the underlying structure of moral thinking. However, it is 
important to underline the fact that Gilligan did not construe care and justice as 
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ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞƐ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌĂƐ ‘ ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǁĂǇƐŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞďĂƐŝĐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨŵŽƌĂů
ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
 
With the shift in perspective from justice to care, the organizing dimension of 
relationship changes from inequality/equality to attachment/detachment, 
reorganizing thoughts, feelings, and language so that words connoting 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉůŝŬĞ “ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ?Žƌ “ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?Žƌ ĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĂůƚĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚ
ĂƐ “ĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ “ĐĂƌĞ ?ƚĂŬĞŽŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ? ?'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? 
 
Zembylas (2010: 234) also notes the distinction between care and justice. 
 
In sum, an ethic of justice focuses on issues of fairness, equality and 
individual rights, seeking impartiality and universality of principles. In 
contrast, the ethic of care focuses on trust, social bonds, cooperation, caring 
relation and responding to needs. 
 
The tension between universalism and parochialism, he writes '...highlights another 
common dualism: between relativism and universalism or, more precisely, between 
the abstract universalist ideal of impartiality and the particularist sentiment and 
practice of partiality (Zembylas, 2010: 235) 
 
The dual-standing position is well rehearsed in the literature. In short, there are four 
main approaches to the justice/care debate (Spader, 2002): 
1. The superiority approach. This holds that one ethic is superior to the other. In 
most cases this is argued in favour of justice, although some do argue for care 
as the superior approach. Others, such as Manning (1992) posit that to 
search for one universal ethic is problematic. 
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2. The separate and equal approach. This position holds that both care and 
justice are equal but separate. In this position the view is that there needs to 
be a separation of the two, but that both need to be present so that a holistic 
understanding might ensue. Here, care is seen as equal to, but distinct from, 
justice; however, justice and care are not opposite but different. There is, 
then, a need to elevate both voices and abandon the idea of ultimate 
answers (Hekman, 1993). Some, e.g. Hardwig (1984) and Held (1987) argue 
that care and justice thinking are specific to different spheres. However, this 
has the danger of reifying the public/private split. In practice, such a thesis is 
difficult; often what occurs is the elevation of one ethic over the other. It may 
also be the case that to differentiate may lead to dichotomies which place 
fixed traits on the other so leading to intolerance and isolationism, usually 
along power lines. 
3. The integration approach seeks to find one monistic theory; that care and 
justice are intertwined. Here the view is that justice cannot exist without care 
and vice versa. This can be helpful, but can also lead to problems if the two 
sides cannot be reconciled in practice. Gilligan does this by relating care to 
the relational self and justice to the separate self; just as these selves become 
intertwined, so do care and justice (Hekman, 1993). This challenges the 
'other' thesis. Gilligan claims that justice and care are both rooted in 
universal truths of human existence. This challenges the dominant model of 
moral psychology and philosophy that the 'human' is the separate, 
autonomous self. Gilligan's work attempted to 'complete' male scientific 
theory so achieving truth and objectivity through the acceptance of feminine 
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viewpoints (Hekman, 1993). One consequence of Gilligan's work is the idea 
that care is superior to justice. However, advocating that care is superior to 
justice merely inverts the universalistic theory that precedes it and is not 
Gilligan's aim. This said, two problems might arise here: the phenomenon in 
focus (care for example), may preclude the other from having a voice. 
Secondly, justice often sees care: as the mercy that tempers justice; of the 
realm of the personal and private; or, altruism that goes beyond the 
requirements of justice. 
4. The diversity approach finds expression through the myriad ways in which 
moral and ethical issues can be tackled. Problematically, integration may be 
required in areas of disagreement or, relativism might ensue due to the 
multiplicity of voices leading to a 'what works' approach. 
 
Notably, Gilligan eschewed the idea that justice and care are separate; rather she 
saw them as intertwined: care as conceived through the prism of justice and care as 
a perspective on moral action. Indeed, she came to view the justice perspective as 
incomplete without the addition of the care perspective (Hekman, 1993). Central to 
her claims was the idea that relational and autonomous selves are not, as was 
previously proposed, different modes of being but are two aspects of human 
existence: self can only be experienced in relationship with others and relationship 
can only be experienced through the differentiation of self from other (Hekman, 
1993). In effect, Gilligan offered a new discourse of morality that sat in opposition to 
the unitary theory espoused by the likes of Kohlberg, whereby only abstract 
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formalistic thought counts as moral; Gilligan asserted that justice and care should be 
given equal validity as moral endeavours (Hekman, 1993). 
 
What is evident in this difference between care and justice is the way in which care is 
seen as a modifier to the distant, rational measures employed within a deontological 
frame and a framework for action in and of itself. The foregrounding of personal 
interrelationships with care construed within a justice framework is clearly a defining 
feature for Gilligan. Key to this is the placing of the self-in-relation whereas in the 
justice perspective, this self is still the origin of action. When speaking of the care-as-
moral-perspective, Gilligan noted that responsiveness is key; it is connection that 
defines the orientation. 
 
For Gilligan, maturity is evidenced through the convergence of justice and care 
resulting in a dialogue (Hekman, 1993). Her sense of care as a basis for moral action, 
as distinct from care as a replacement for justice connects individuals through the  
 
 ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌŝŶŐƚĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?tŝƚŚŝŶƚŚŝƐ
framework, detachment, whether from self or others, is morally problematic, 
since it breeds moral blindness or indifference  W a failure to discern or 
respond to need. The question of what responses constitute care and what 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐůĞĂĚƚŽŚƵƌƚĚƌĂǁƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶƚĞƌŵƐŵĂǇ
differ from those of others. (Gilligan, 1995: 36, 37) 
 
ƐŽŶĞŽĨ'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐŵĂůĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƐƐĂŝĚƉĞŽƉůĞ ‘ ?ŚĂǀĞƌĂůĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞ
attached to something, and equality does not give you attachment. Equality 
fractures society and places on every person the burden of standing on his own two 
ĨĞĞƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?^ƵĐŚĂƐŚŝĨƚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐĂĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚ ĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŵŽƌĂů
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consideration from hierarchical to network. It not only offers new scope for 
considering relationships, it also necessitates a response to need; an attempt to 
answer ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ “ŚŽǁƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ? ?/ƚŝƐƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ-positioning 
ƚŚĂƚŝƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶ'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŚĞƌŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĚĞŶŽƚĞĂŶĞŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
justice in favour of care, or vice-versa. Instead, it notes the ambiguity in the 
construction of questions concerning what is the problem to be solved. As Baier 
(1995) noted, as individuals we are capable of adopting, and indeed do adopt, one or 
both of the orientations. 
 
Writing in this tradition, Baier (1995) noted the ways in which infants become aware 
ŽĨƚǁŽ ‘ĞǀŝůƐ ? PŽĨĚĞƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚŽƌŝƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌƐǁŚŽƐĞůŽǀĞŽŶĞŶĞĞĚƐ ?ĂŶĚ ?
the evil of relative powerlessness. In turn, through socialisation and child-rearing 
practices these reinforce or preclude one or the other of two dimensions of moral 
disposition from developing as the predominant orientation: attachment, aimed at 
satisfying community with others; and, equality aimed at autonomy. In a challenge 
to Piaget, Gilligan identifies that male egocentrism is not inherent but that it 
develops as a ƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨďŽǇ ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌŽůĞƐĂĚŽƉƚĞĚďǇŵŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?
dŚƵƐƐŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ĂƐƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ?ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐĂŶĚ
egocentric (Hekman, 1993: 147) replacing it instead with a dualistic theory of moral 
development.  
 
A caring primary education: implications from Gilligan 
I argued earlier that one of the underpinning rationales for primary education is the 
explication of a caring environment (cf. Nias, 1989). Indeed, care has long been seen 
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as part of the primary teaching exchange; teaching as a reciprocal endeavour 
(Goldstein and Lake, 2000). It would be propitious to explore, therefore, the place 
for an ethic of care in primary education policy and practice; for whilst such a 
position might well be theoretically desired it is fair to say that in practice such 
moves may be constrained by a culture of performativity (Jeffrey, 2002, 2003). 
However, it should not be surmised that I am arguing that care has been lost in 
primary education; I am not. Rather, I am arguing that care, possibly, now has less 
space in which to operate than previously. Contemporary, justice-based approaches 
to defining the content and outputs of primary education are seemingly in 
contradiction with historical perceptions of what primary education might mean. In 
this regard the proclivities of current regimes would suggest that there is minimal 
place for care; justice seems to hold court. 
 
'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐĂƌĞŝŵŵĞŶƐĞůǇŚĞůƉĨƵůŚĞƌĞ ?ƐůƵŵ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶŽƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ ‘Ă
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǀŽŝĐĞ ?ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚĂƚĞƐƐƉĂĐĞďĞŝŶŐŐŝǀĞn to the idea of care and the ways in 
which it helps us conceive of transformations to the nature of moral, political and 
ƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨ'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐĂĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĂĚƵĂůŝƐƚŝĐ
theory of care and justice. Her work is, in orientation, feminist in that it purports to 
examine why, in our culture, women are expected to exhibit caring and nurturing 
qualities as opposed to male considerations of abstract justice. As Hekman (1993: 
153) notes, Gilligan 
 
 ‘ ?ŝƐĐůĞĂƌŝŶŚĞƌĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ Western tradition of morality excludes the 
ŵŽƌĂůĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚǁŽŵĞŶ ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶ
/ŶĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨĂƌĞ P'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞĨŽƌƉƵďůŝĐĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ 
 25 
ĂĚĚƚŚŝƐ “ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǀŽŝĐĞ ?ƚŽƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂƐĂƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ?ŽƌĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞ ?
ďƵƚĞƋƵĂůĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ? 
 
^Ž ?'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨŽƌat least two reasons. Firstly, as Robinson (1999) 
ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ? ‘ĐĂƌĞ-ĞƚŚŝĐƐ ? ?ŝĨƐĞĞŶƐŽůĞůǇĂƐĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ-based 
conceptions, loses its potency as a transformative agent in the drive to realign the 
relationship between morality and politics. For the dominance of the neoliberal line 
is such that alternative standpoints are often lost. 
 
/ĨĐĂƌĞĞƚŚŝĐƐŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚƐŽůĞůǇĂƐĂ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŽƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?
ŝŵƉĂƌƚŝĂůŝƐƚƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ?ŽƌƐŝŵƉůǇĂƐĂ ‘ƵƐĞĨƵůĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽŽƵƌŵŽƌĂůǀŽĐĂďƵůĂƌǇ, 
ƚŚĞŶŝƚǁŝůůĂůǁĂǇƐƌĞƚĂŝŶŝƚƐŝŵĂŐĞĂƐĂ ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ? ? ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ?ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ
antithetical to justice and most relevant to women as mothers and, more 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ?ŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐƉŚĞƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ? ?
[C]are can transcend these apparent limitations when it is understood not 
ƐŝŵƉůǇĂƐĂŶĂƌƌŽǁƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƌĂ ‘ŵŽƌĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ďƵƚĂƐĂ
value and a practice which informs our daily lives, with the capacity to 
transform our understanding of both morality and politics and, ultimately, of 
the relationship between them. (Robinson, 1999: 12) 
 
For as Tong (1998: 132) notes as well, 
 
/ŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ? ?/ŚĂǀĞĐŽŵĞƚŽƌĞĂůŝƐĞƚŚĂƚ/ŵŽƐƚŽĨƚĞŶƵƐĞĚƚŚĞ
language of justice to justify my moral decisions to my colleagues, students 
and the world in general, while I most often used the language of care to 
justify my moral decisions to myself, my family and my friends. 
 
Here it is necessary to identify commonality in the ways in which care and caring are 
used by the various proponents. As stated above, for psychologists, care is taken as a 
position from which moral development might be construed. The position offered is 
one of thinking about moral decision-making as relational, and not as something 
impersonal and bound by rational utilitarianism. As well, philosophically, care is 
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often akin to virtue: a way of organising relationships so that they might lead to a 
better life. Although the ways in which care is used differs between the two, there is 
commonality in the fact that both talk of the self in connection with others. The 
emphasis is on the interpersonal as a means of understanding human existence. As 
Sherblom (2008: 88-89) states, it is the underpinning of the care discourse that offers 
much for primary education. 
 
Care reasoners assume a level of interdependence and connection with other 
people far more relationally embedded than the individual autonomy 
emphasised by the ethic of justice, and typical of justice reasoners. Care 
reasoners view action as responsive and assume caring as a moral mandate. 
Thus detachment is problematic because it means that there is a failure to 
respond to others' needs 
 
This resonates with primary education: part of the rationale at this stage is certainly 
one of connection between selves; the realisation of human inter-connectivity. The 
work of Gilligan in this matter is clear: care, construed as a means whereby the self 
might affect and be affected by others for better or worse, denotes an 
understanding that connectedness is just as important as rational, impersonal 
decision-making. Whilst it is the case that current political imperatives seek to orient 
primary education in ways conversant with justice interpretations and orientations, 
'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?Ɛ ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǀŽŝĐĞ ?ŐŝǀĞƐƐƵĐĐŽƵƌƚŽƚŚŽƐĞwho wish to acknowledge and state 
that primary education should have connectedness at its heart. However, as 
Goldstein and Lake (2000) state, there is a danger here: simply equating teaching 
ǁŝƚŚĐĂƌŝŶŐƌĞĚƵĐĞƐƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵƉůĞǆĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇƚŽůŝƚƚůĞŵŽƌĞthan 'flat 
representations' commonly found in media images. Indeed, in their research, 
teachers were often seen as those representations found in television programmes 
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or greetings cards. Importantly, teaching may thus become equated with a set of 
affective traits: the 'mumsy' discourse, an idealised, middle class discourse with 
socially approved feminine virtues. Gilligan's work is, however, non-essentialist and 
destabilises the boundaries between the political and non-political. 
 
Secondly, that primary education is a female dominated profession is not news. 
Forrester (2005) notes how the teaching of younger children, whilst originally the 
preserve of men, has become associĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ?ǁŽƌŬƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ
nineteenth century. She writes how primaƌǇƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐŝƐƐĞĞŶĂƐĂ ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂůĂĐƚ ?ĨŽƌ
women and that caring is part of this orientation. The danger is obvious though: 
care, with its attendant female/feminist orientation is in danger of being relegated 
when compared to the viewpoint that celebrates ƚŚĞ ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ŽĨƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐĂŶĚ
rigour; for patriarchal standpoints often neuter other, non-male views. The 
ĨĞŵŝŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĂƐĐƵůŝŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƐĐŚŽŽůƐ ‘ ?ŝŶǀŝƚĞ
the development and appropriation of ideologies of care as gendered controls in the 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨƚĞĂĐŚĞƌƐ ?ǁŽƌŬ ? ?^ŚĂĐŬůŽĐŬ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĂƚĐĂƌĞŝƐŶŽƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ ?
rather it stands as subordinate to the discourse of individualism and is defined in 
ƐƵĐŚƚĞƌŵƐ ?dŚƵƐ ?ĐĂƌĞďĞĐŽŵĞƐƌĞĨƌĂŵĞĚĂƐ ‘ĐĂƌĞĂďŽƵƚĂƚƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ?Žƌ ‘ĐĂƌĞĂďŽƵƚ
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ?tŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞƐĞƚŚŝŶŐƐŵĂƚƚĞƌƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?ƚŚĞǇŵĂƚƚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
are about things outside of relationships; they do not develop the human 
endeavour. What is elided in the separation of care and education, if we are not 
careful, is the relational. 
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As care ethics relies on conceptions of human good and is therefore transformative 
it is about seeing the world in actual terms; taking the ethic of care seriously in 
political terms would, thus, have serious ramifications for social arrangements 
(Deveaux, 1995). Indeed, the location of care as an emancipatory discourse located 
in inequality places it squarely in the political.  Citing an ethic of care as an element 
of subjugated discourse can hold up for scrutiny dominant speech and practice 
(McLaughlin, 1997). 
 
Such issues are not simply theoretical either: the delineation of work into paid and 
unpaid, audited and unaudited (cf. Acker, 1999) for example, marks out the ways in 
which gender-based conceptions of work become reified at the level of professional 
activity and personal relationships. Those elements of teaching which command 
attention by managers and policy-ŵĂŬĞƌƐďĞĐŽŵĞƐĞĞŶƚŽďĞ ‘ǁŽƌŬ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚŽƚŚĞƌ
ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŶŽƚĂďůǇĐĂƌŝŶŐ ?ďĞĐŽŵĞƌĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨ ‘ŶŽŶ-woƌŬ ? ?Ɛƚhis 
gendered discourse is borne of a male governed social structure dominated by ideas 
ĂďŽƵƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƉĂŝĚĂŶĚƵŶƉĂŝĚǁŽƌŬ ?ŝƚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐĨĞŵĂůĞƐĂ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ
sphere; their role becomes constructed as private (Vogt, 2002). 
 
It is notable ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ƚŚĂƚ'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂŶĚƵƐĞĚďǇŽƚŚĞƌƐǁŚŽ
ǁŝƐŚƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂ “ƐƚĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ƐŽŵĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĞĞƚŚŝŶŐƐ
ďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ? ?dŽŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐŝƚĞĚĂƐĂŶ
influence on the likes of Sarah Ruddick and Nel Noddings, both of whom argue that 
the caring, connected moral perspective of women is superior to the abstract 
ĨŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇŽĨŵĞŶ ?ƐĂĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉƚŚĞ “ĞƚŚŝĐƐ
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ŽĨĐĂƌĞ ?ŝƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝŶ'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ
above. What all these have in common is the view that morality is more than simply 
an attempt to generate and follow a set of rules. As Tong (1997) notes, whereas the 
justice ideal utilises conscientiousness to orient action through its desire to see us 
 ‘ ?ǁŽƌŬŚĂƌĚƚŽĨƵůĨŝůŽƵƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƚŽĂĚŚĞƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇƚŽĚƵƚǇĂŶĚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?
kindness leads us to notice the distress of a little boy wondering around lost, and to 
ŚĞůƉŚŝŵĨŝŶĚŚŝƐĨĂƚŚĞƌŽƌŵŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?(Blum, 1980: 162). 
 
But Gilligan does not desire to see justice and care as opposites. Rather, she sees 
them as positions of equal worth which need to be intertwined, and this is what is 
important for primary education. Within current neoliberal conceptions of 
education, care can offer an alternative to the harshness of the individualising 
project. It can present a frame within which primary practice can operate. 
Additionally, justice offers the care perspective a lens through which to begin to 
examine the ǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ ‘ŐĞŶĚĞƌĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞ
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĞĚ ?/ƚŽĨĨĞƌƐĂŵĞĂŶƐǁŚĞƌĞďǇƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƉƵƌƉŽƌƚ ‘ƚŽĐĂƌĞ ?ĐĂŶǀŝĞǁƚŚĞŝƌ
work in regard to wider sociological and political matters. For to care without due 
regard for wider political motivations leaves the teacher open to challenge; 
education has a set of priorities and to operate without these in mind, albeit 
tempered by the care perspective, is foolhardy. It seems crucial, then, to ask how 
current policy orientations position care within primary education. This signals the 
ways in which contemporary matters orient the work of schools and individual 
teachers. It is necessary to identify what policy has to say about the relational. It 
seeks to ask questions about the ways in which interpersonal matters are 
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foregrounded both between teachers and pupils, pupils and pupils and teachers and 
teachers. But it is also necessary to consider the ways in which professionals mediate 
the relationship between caring and justice seeking; how do those who work in 
primary school play out their role in the current policy climate. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that care can offer an alternative to the harsh realities of the 
neoliberal, justice perspective for education, but only if care and justice are seen as 
intertwined. It outlined the ways in which neoliberalism orients current educational 
policy and practice and how this is reflective of a justice orientation. This alignment 
was then contrasted with extant views for primary education that see it as having an 
ethos akin to a caring enterprise. Such perspectives, I argued, offer primary 
ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚĞŶŽƌ ?/ŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ'ŝůůŝŐĂŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁĂƐĐŝƚĞĚĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐ
whereby primary practitioners and policy-makers might understand the interplay 
between care and justice. In essence what the paper calls for is an understanding 
that to conceive of either care without justice or justice without care is unhelpful; 
the two offer differing viewpoints which enrich each other. In this way the paper 
argues that care is an educational matter that is of as much importance now as ever. 
Whilst the neoliberal project might do well in detracting from this, it is not a forgone 
conclusion that care is off the agenda. The work of many in primary schools attests 
to this. Indeed it would seem that its currency is ever greater if we are to think of it 
as offering a partner for, rather than a contrast to, justice. 
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